Can belief shocks make trading excessive ? We present a dynamic inventory management model in which belief shocks gradually propagate across traders, leading to the in ‡ated trading activity which reduces traders'welfare. Trading can be socially bene…cial because smoothing heterogeneous asset positions saves inventory costs. Without belief shocks, traders focus on the socially bene…cial trading and the dispersion of the asset positions decreases monotonically. We show that one-shot belief shocks induce a speculative trading, which aggregates information but slows down the convergence of the asset positions. When traders' beliefs change quickly, the dispersion of the asset positions goes up, creating a cyclical pattern in volume. We also show that the high frequency trading ampli…es the impact of belief shocks by making the speculation less costly, and therefore steering traders away from the socially bene…cial trading motive.
Introduction
Many, both in academia and practice, argue that the trading activity in …nancial markets appears excessive because it is di¢ cult to rationalize the level and rich dynamic patterns of asset trading on the basis of traders'fundamental needs. One explanation for the excessiveness is that a large amount of trading may be generated by belief shocks. Indeed, the high correlation between volume and information ‡ows has been well documented.
1 Two questions arise: (i) how do belief shocks a¤ect the dynamics of trading? and (ii) does the trading generated by belief shocks reduce traders'welfare? Regarding the …rst question, it is important to identify an internal and rational economic mechanism because an arbitrary sequence of news and/or arbitrary reactions to news can explain almost anything. Speci…cally we ask: can a one-shot arrival of belief shocks followed by a rational learning process generate rich patterns of dynamic trading? We present a model in which belief shocks gradually propagate across traders, leading to the in ‡ated and ‡uctuating trading activity. Based on this model, our answer to the second question is yes: the additional trading induced by belief shocks wastes resources -it is ine¢ ciently excessive.
We present a …nite-horizon inventory management model with information frictions.
There is a single risky asset and each trader is hit by an idiosyncratic endowment shock at the beginning. Due to convex inventory costs, the higher cross-sectional dispersion of the asset positions wastes more resources. Hence trading that reduces (increases) the dispersion improves (hurts) traders' welfare. We assume that the large market where everyone can trade at once does not exist and that the trading process is local and gradual: in each period there are many trading venues, and at each venue, a small number of traders are randomly about the asset value) the cross-sectional dispersion of the asset positions decreases in each period. As the allocation approaches the …rst best of zero dispersion, volume also decreases.
We use this dynamic path as a benchmark (Lemma 1).
To the benchmark we add belief shocks. Before the trading process starts, each trader observes a noisy signal about the asset value. The belief shocks are idiosyncratic, but they a¤ect the equilibrium because the Law of Large Numbers does not apply in small markets.
In each trading round, prices that clear a local market aggregate the information within each market. Because the dispersion of asset positions acts as an endogenous noise in the dynamic learning process, the extent of the information aggregation depends on how much traders speculate on their signals relative to trading motivated by the inventory management. Thus, not only the asset positions but also beliefs about the asset value endogenously change over time. In turn, changes in the distribution of the asset positions and beliefs a¤ect traders' strategies through rational expectations.
We show that belief shocks and the subsequent learning process signi…cantly alter the dynamics of trading. First, one-shot belief shocks persistently slow down the convergence of the asset positions relative to the benchmark, and the faster learning is associated with the slower convergence of the asset positions (Proposition 2). Second, when traders speculate aggressively and hence their beliefs change su¢ ciently quickly, the dispersion of their asset positions goes up. As a result, the volume can temporarily go up, creating a cyclical pattern (Proposition 3). Figure 1 shows a time-series of the volume. In the benchmark, the volume monotonically approaches zero (the red dotted line labeled as "w/o belief shocks").
With belief shocks, the volume is persistently higher and temporarily goes up without any external shocks (the blue solid line). Thus, the model can rationalize an in ‡ated and nonmonotonic trading dynamics by one-shot belief shocks. Other parameter values are given in the Appendix.
Our analysis sheds a new light on the role of belief shocks in …nancial markets. In many …nance models, idiosyncratic shocks do not a¤ect the equilibrium. This largely re ‡ects the view that idiosyncratic shocks are eliminated by the Law of Large Numbers in a large economy. 2 We o¤er an alternative view: the trading activity is local in that the number of traders directly interacting at a time is negligible compared to the total number of traders.
Because idiosyncratic shocks are averaged only within a small group, they propagate across traders over time. Our focus on idiosyncratic shocks is the extreme opposite of the standard approach: while the standard approach purges idiosyncratic shocks in a single large market, we introduce many small markets to study a dynamic propagation of idiosyncratic shocks, but purge aggregate shocks from the model.
The ine¢ ciency in our model is caused by the rationality: if all traders (irrationally) ignored the signals, trading would not be excessive (i.e., the lower line in Figure 1 ). The model highlights the negative externality of idiosyncratic belief shocks in small markets.
Each trader is forward-looking and optimizes his dynamic trading strategy by using a noisy but informative signal in a rational (Bayesian) way. While traders understand that the distribution of the asset positions becomes more dispersed and converges more slowly because 2 Hellwig (1980) is an example where idiosyncratic shocks do not a¤ect the equilibrium.
they speculate on noisy signals, they fail to internalize welfare costs of such speculation.
The model identi…es a dynamic leverage mechanism that ampli…es the impact of belief shocks. For given belief shocks, the more trading rounds are anticipated, the more ampli…ed is the non-monotonicity of the dispersion and volume. With more future trading rounds, traders put a larger weight on future payo¤s than on the current payo¤. Future payo¤s depend on future prices, which are more correlated with the asset value than current prices are, because of the non-stationary learning process. Therefore, as the importance of future trading rounds increases, the signals are given more leverage for forecasting future prices.
Accordingly, traders speculate more relative to the inventory management in early rounds.
As a result, traders will have relatively more dispersed asset positions and more symmetric beliefs in later rounds. Because there are less room for the speculation and more gains from the inventory management, the convergence of the asset positions becomes faster. Thus, the slower convergence/faster learning in early rounds and the subsequent faster convergence/slower learning are a rational response to more trading opportunities. The aggressive speculation in early rounds arise precisely because traders rationally anticipate that they will have trading opportunities when beliefs become more symmetric after the speculation.
Our model shows that when markets are segmented, giving more trading opportunities to traders can generate more volume by endogenously changing traders'objectives. While we do not explicitly model an intermediation sector, the result is suggestive for the industrial organization of …nancial markets: intermediaries who pro…t from the volume may …nd such a market structure attractive at the expense of traders.
To characterize an equilibrium in a decentralized trading model with heterogeneous information, we need to keep track of a joint distribution of asset positions and beliefs. This is a technically hard and intricate problem. We use two assumptions to overcome the issue of the dimensionality: (i) there is a known bound on the number of trading rounds, (ii) all the random variables are normally distributed. This allows us to describe the dynamics of the joint distribution as a solution to a simple …xed point problem.
Related literature.
Our model captures a potential implication of the high-frequency trading: giving more trading opportunities may endogenously distort traders'objectives away from a socially bene…cial one. The literature on the high-frequency trading mostly focused on the speed di¤erence among traders (Biais et al 2014, Ait-Sahalia and Saglam 2014), and abstracted from the dynamic learning. In these models, the welfare implication requires taking a stand on how to weight di¤erent classes of traders because fast traders typically win at the expense of slow traders. Our work complements the literature by studying the welfare implication of giving all traders more opportunities to trade. In our ex ante symmetric environment, the welfare implication is unambiguous: when trading becomes excessive, more inventory costs are wasted and all traders are worse o¤.
Many market-microstructure models directly assume a volume process (e.g. noise traders
in Kyle 1985) . This left us in a situation with "trading volume whose size, function, and operation we do not understand" (Cochrane 2013 This paper also contributes to the literature on the dynamic information aggregation.
4 3 The full sentence from which the quote was taken is "But as with active management, perhaps we should work just a little harder before dismissing the hundreds of years of trading activity, and the entire existence of the New York Stock Exchange, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and other markets, as monuments to human folly, or before advocating regulations such as transactions taxes -the perennial favorite answer in search of a question-to reduce trading volume whose size, function, and operation we do not understand." (page 44, Cochrane 2013). 4 The most closely related work is Golosov et al (2013) . They study a model of dynamic asset trading with asymmetric information, in which traders have two motives for trading as in our model. Their model has an in…nite time horizon, and they focus on long-run consequences of the one-sided learning. Our model has a …nite time horizon and everyone is learning. This allows us to study short-run consequences of the dynamic information aggregation process.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a model environment, a trading rule, and a solution concept. We also set up a benchmark without belief shocks 
Model
We describe a model environment, a trading rule, and a dynamic solution concept in the next three subsections. The last subsection presents a benchmark without belief shocks.
Environment
The economy has two assets and a continuum of risk neutral traders. A risky asset (henceforth, the asset) is perfectly divisible and has uncertain payo¤. There is a convex cost of holding the asset. This creates gains from smoothing the asset positions by using a non-risky asset (henceforth, the money) as a means of exchange. Each trader starts with a di¤erent amount of the asset and an independent noisy signal about its value. Thus, each trader has two pieces of private information: the signal and the position of the asset.
The trading is locally intermediated in the following sense. There is a continuum of locations. In each location, n+1 traders are randomly drawn from the population distribution at each time. A …nite number n 2 is …xed. 5 Each trader submits his demand for the asset, 5 We focus on n 2 so that smoothing can occur in the benchmark case.
which is explicitly conditioned on the price he must pay (the amount of the money exchanged for one unit of the asset). In each location, given submitted orders, a price for each trader
is determined such that a market is "locally cleared". In each period, the game ends with some probability. When the game does not end, each trader is matched with a new n traders randomly drawn from the population. Following the literature on dynamic random matching, we assume that no pair of traders meet twice. As the trading process continues, the cross-sectional joint distribution of the asset positions and traders' beliefs about the asset value endogenously change. Each trader rationally forms an expectation about how the distribution evolves over time, and knows that he or she will trade with a random sample of n traders whose types are drawn from the rationally anticipated distribution.
We index a unit measure of traders by i 2 I. The asset has the uncertain unit payo¤ v in units of the money. The unit payo¤ v is realized at time t = T + 1 and not known to anyone until then. Traders have a common prior that v is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance The signal takes the form
where " i is unobserved noise in the signal, and follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 1 " . To summarize, random variables v; fx i0 ; " i g i2I are normally and independently distributed with zero means, and variances
Let b i0 be trader i's initial money position. We assume that the net return on the money is zero. Given an initial position (x i0 ; b i0 ) of the asset and the money, the payo¤ from adding q i units of the asset and r i units of the money is
Trading rule
We study a dynamic variation of the order-submission game in Kyle (1989) . 10 To keep the dynamic analysis tractable, we modify a trading rule to induce a price-taking behavior.
Trader i's money trade is determined by
where p i is the unit price of the asset charged for trader i. The individual price p i is determined by the following local pricing rule
where
is price-contingent orders submitted by traders. Hence, trader i's unit price p i is determined independent of his order q i ( ), while his asset trade is determined by q i (p i ).
This makes traders a price-taker, but allows them to internalize informational contents of other n traders'orders fq j ( )g j6 =i by best-responding to every possible realization of p i . Due to the ex ante symmetry among traders, prices
Remark 1.
In practice, a market maker can o¤er di¤erent prices for di¤erent traders to "locally clear" a market he makes, while allowing traders to adjust the quantity traded at the o¤ered prices. In the model, this is achieved by orders conditioned on prices. Our trading rule also captures the idea that market makers facilitate the communication among traders. One interpretation of the pricing rule (2) is that, the market maker o¤ers trader i a hypothetical price at which the other n traders would trade without i. Such a price provides a useful information to trader i, which he internalizes in his order. Because every trader does the same reasoning, the market maker facilitates the communication in equilibrium.
Remark 2.
In the Appendix we consider a generalized payment with a transaction cost r i = (q i + c jq i j) p i , c 0, and show that c > 0 is necessary to make the total payment by n + 1 traders non-negative. Because this form of transaction costs does not a¤ect the asset allocation in the linear equilibrium we study, we assume c = 0 throughout our analysis.
Dynamic equilibrium
We denote each trader's asset trade at time t by q it and the associated money trade by r it .
Given v, the gross payo¤ at the end of time t is
If the game ends after trading at time t, the trader i's expected utility is
The information set F it starts with F i0 = fs i0 ; x i0 g, and expands over time re ‡ecting the new information that trader i learns over time. At the end of each trading round t T 1, there is positive probability 1 2 (0; 1) that the game ends and no more trading occurs.
Therefore, the expected lifetime utility evaluated at time t is
The parameter is a probability weight put on future trading rounds, which measures the expected frequency of trading. 11 We assume 1 2 , i.e., traders weakly discount the future 11 An alternative interpretation is that 1 is a probability of an aggregate event that forces traders to be stuck with their positions.
trading rounds relative to the current trading round.
At each time t = 1; ::; T , given that the game has not ended, each trader is matched with a …nite number n 2 N of other traders randomly drawn from the population. In each local market, each trader submits his order q it ( ; F it ) to a market maker, which is explicitly conditioned on the unit price p it he must pay. Given submitted n + 1 orders {q it ( ; F it )} n+1 i=1 , the market maker determines {p it } i=1;::;n+1 by
The asset is traded according to {q it (p it ;
In the next period, each trader is matched with new traders.
De…nition A dynamic equilibrium is a collection {q it ( ; F it ), p it , F it } i2I;t=1;::;T which satisfy for t = 1; ::; T ,
(ii) For each local trading, (5) determines p it for i = 1; ::; n + 1.
(iii) Each trader forms a Bayesian belief about the distributions of v and {p it , x it 1 } i2I;t=1;::;T consistent with the other equilibrium variables.
At time t 1, each trader's information set F it contains the initial private information (s i0 ; x i0 ) and endogenous information obtained in the previous t 1 trading rounds. In the de…nition above, F it contains the price he pays at time t (i.e., p it 2 F it ) even though each trader does not know the realization of p it . This is because each trader can choose his best response for each realization of p it by making the order conditioned on p it .
A benchmark without belief shocks
We study a case " = 0, where the information about v symmetric, i.e., E [vjF it ] = 0 for all i and t. The …rst best allocation (without cross-sectional restrictions on trading) is that everyone holds the population average asset position E [x i0 ] = 0. We show that without belief shocks the equilibrium allocation monotonically approaches the …rst best allocation. We the local average by x t
x it etc, and the local average except trader i by x it
is the cross-sectional variance of the asset positions.
(b) The dispersion of the asset positions changes according to
and the social welfare at the end of period t is W t = 1 2
In each round t, trader i is matched with n new traders. By the end of time t, trader i has traded with nt other traders, but he indirectly traded with n t traders because sets of trading counterparties do not overlap. Therefore, the asset positions converge at the rate n t . Thus, as long as n 2, the allocation approaches the …rst best at the rate 1 n . 12 The next section studies how the belief shocks at t = 0 alter this dynamics.
Two-period example
This section presents a two-period example to illustrate a key economic force.
Incorporation of belief shocks into allocations.
First, we consider a one-shot trading (T = 1). Following the microstructure literature, we use a guess-and-verify method to characterize a linear equilibrium. Conjecture the order of the form:
where ( s ; x ; p ) are determined in equilibrium. From (2), local prices are given by
By substituting this into (6), the equilibrium trade is
The …rst term is the trade generated by belief shocks s i0 s i0 = " i0 " i0 , while the second term is the trade that smooths the asset positions. These re ‡ect two motives for trading: speculation and the inventory management. The relative importance of the two motives can be measured by x s , which is endogenous.
Local prices are new signals about the asset value because
Local prices (7) are noisy for two reasons. First, idiosyncratic belief shocks f" j0 g j6 =i are
averaged, but do not disappear because n is small. Second,
x j0 is also stochastic from trader i's point of view. By the Bayes rule, the informational content of (7) is
To measure the share of the information revealed by p i relative to n signals, we de…ne
Note that ' depends on the equilibrium trading behavior through x s . 13 We used q i for q i (p i ; s i0 ; x i0 ) to suppress the notation.
Lemma 2 (one-shot trade with belief shocks) (a) Equilibrium trade is
where ' 2 (0; 1) is characterized in the proof.
and the social welfare at the end of period 1 is
(c) The dispersion goes up when traders'beliefs change su¢ ciently, i.e.,
For any n 2, v 2 [0; 1), and " 2 (0; 1), this occurs if x is su¢ ciently large.
Lemma 2(a) shows that traders with high (low) realizations of belief shocks buy more (less) of the asset relative to the benchmark trade. This speculative trading has the following properties: (i) it has mean zero, (ii) its variance positively depends on the informativeness of the prices ', (iii) it is orthogonal to x i0 x i0 . Thus, the speculation increases the dispersion of the asset positions without changing its mean. These properties also hold with an arbitrary number of periods. Note that
for ' > 0. Thus, Lemma 2(b) shows the slower convergence of the asset positions than the benchmark. The larger belief change is associated with the slower convergence, as a larger ' in (8) implies a larger impact of belief shocks. This reduces welfare because more inventory costs are wasted. Lemma 2(c) provides a condition for the dispersion to increase. Because n' measures the total amount of information each trader learns from prices, the condition (9) means that the change in traders' beliefs is large relative to the amount of inventory smoothing. Any parameter change that makes ' su¢ ciently large can satisfy (9) . For example, the dispersion does not increase in any of the following cases:
14 Intuitively, more symmetric information ( " ! 0 or " ! 1 or v ! 1) or higher gains from the inventory smoothing ( x ! 0) imply less speculation in equilibrium. As a result, the impact of belief shocks is not strong enough to overturn the e¤ect of the inventory management.
Dynamic ampli…cation.
Next, we introduce the second round. After the …rst round, traders have asset positions fx i1 g and two signals fs i0 ; s i1 g, where s i1 = p s p i1 as in (7). Prices in the second round will aggregate information contained in fs i0 ; s i1 g. There are two connections between the two rounds: (i) the sharing of information in the second round is a¤ected by the dispersion of the asset positions and beliefs achieved in the …rst round, (ii) trading in the …rst round is a¤ected by the anticipated informativeness of prices in the second round. The …rst connection should be straightforward, while the second connection may be less obvious. We elaborate more on the latter.
We construct a linear equilibrium of the form:
where coe¢ cients
p 2 depend only on primitive parameters. In the …rst round, anticipating the second round with probability , trader i solves
are determined in the second round. The …rst line in (11) is the expected utility for the case the game ends after the …rst round, while the second line corresponds to the case where there are two rounds. In the second round trader i solves
In the second round equilibrium,
These equilibrium objects appear in (11) if and only if > 0. First, p i2 does not depend on q i1 . Second, taking the …rst order condition of (12), it is easy to verify
does not depend on q i1 either. Finally, q i2 depends on q i1 through x i1 = q i1 + x i0 . Dropping irrelevant terms, (11) can be written as
The expected gross payo¤ from the asset consists of the asset's fundamental value E i1 [v] and its expected resale price E i1 [p i2 ]. The latter depends on the second round trading environment. Importantly, from (13), p i2 is correlated with v because of the speculation in the second round. Formally, we show that
where ' 1 and ' 2 are de…ned by
Note that ' 2 measures the fraction of information revealed by p i2 relative to n 2 of original signals (i.e. fs j0 g for all j with whom i has directly and indirectly interacted). All in all, the …rst round problem is
The amount of speculation increases if the weight put on E i1 [v] relative to the weight on q i1 + x i0 increases. From the …rst order condition of (14) , this relative weight is
There are two forces in (15) . First, an increase in shifts traders'objective from the inventory management to the speculation. Second, the more anticipated learning in the second round (i.e. a larger ' 2 ) encourages more speculation in the …rst round. The two forces complement each other, leading to higher ' 1 (relative to ' in Lemma 2). In a dynamic environment, forward-looking traders rationally anticipate that future prices are more correlated with v.
Because the future prices enter the objective positively through the resale possibility, as increases, the current signal is given a higher leverage in forecasting v.
Lemma 3 (dynamic ampli…cation)
In anticipation of the second round trading (i.e. > 0), equilibrium trade in the …rst round incorporates more belief shocks. Speci…cally,
where ' 1 is greater than ' for the one-shot trading.
Because ' 1 and ' 2 are mutually dependent, they must be jointly determined. For a general case with T rounds, we solve a …xed point problem in (' 1 ; ::; ' T ).
Dynamic equilibrium with belief shocks
We …rst sketch the construction of a dynamic equilibrium. Readers who are not interested in technical details may skip to subsection 4.2 where main results are presented.
Equilibrium construction
We construct a dynamic equilibrium with the following properties:
Property I: At the beginning of period t, the asset positions, x it 1 , has a cross-sectional distribution N 0; Property III: For time t trading, trader i submits an order
We show below that signals fs ik g t 1 k=1 except the initial signal s i0 are endogenously generated by equilibrium prices. Also, f xt ; ' t g T t=1 in Property I and II is endogenously determined by the orders in Property III, while the orders are chosen by traders who rationally anticipate
We characterize this dynamic equilibrium in two steps. First, we establish Property I and II taking Property III as given. Second, we characterize by the guess-and-verify method combined with a backward induction.
Step 1: Allocation and beliefs.
Property I and II are satis…ed at t = 1 with ' 0 1. Given the conjecture (16), equilibrium prices and quantities at time t must satisfy
Hence, x it 1 and x it = q it + x it 1 are related by the following condition:
Suppose that Property I and II hold at time t. Given that x it 1 follows N 0;
1 xt 1 and " ik follows N 0;
Thus, Property I holds at time t + 1 with xt determined by (20 Suppose Property II holds in period t. The signal s it is independent across i and also independent from fs ik g t 1 k=0 conditional on v, because no pair of traders meets twice and does not share the previous history. Therefore,
We de…ne ' t by equating (22) with " n t ' t , i.e.,
Thus, Property II holds in period t + 1 with s it de…ned by (21) and ' t de…ned by (23) . By the end of period t 1, trader i has signals fs ik g t 1 k=1 , which are informationally equivalent to his price history fp ik g t 1
k=1
. Two dynamic equations (20) and (23) . It should be clear from the derivation of these two equations that Properties I and II hold for time t if they hold for time up to t 1. Hence, Properties I and II were veri…ed given Property III.
Step 2: Strategies.
We verify Property III by showing that trader i's optimal order takes the conjectured form (16) given that all the others use the same form. Each trader i's belief about v at time t is summarized by its conditional mean and variance, and characterized by the Bayes rule. We measure the cumulative amount of information held by each trader at the end of period t by
which is bounded below by one and increases in t. The conditional expectation of v is
The expression (24) is linear in fs ik g t 1 k=0 and p it . Therefore, the optimal order takes the linear form of Property III. We relegate the rest of the characterization to the Appendix.
Main results
To capture the non-stationarity induced by learning, we de…ne a dynamic leverage factor f T t g T t=1 = f T 1 ; T 2 ; ::; 1 ; 0 g as follows:
T (t+1) for t T 1 and 0 1.
The subscript T t denotes the maximum number of remaining rounds at time t. The leverage factor (25) generalizes (15) . 15 It measures the time-varying importance of future prices for each round t by taking into account the probability 2 [0; 1] that the game continues and the information accumulation f t g T t=1 . First, suppose = 0. In this case, traders do not internalize the inter-temporal implication of the information aggregation and T t = 1 for all t. In other words, all rounds are the same as far as the relevance of future prices is concerned. With > 0, traders internalize the fact that prices become more informative over time relative to prior belief v . This is captured by
, which increases over time 15 To see this, set T t = 2 1 = 1.
given v > 0. 16 Thus, a higher raises T t uniformly for all t < T . Second, for a …xed > 0, i . 17 The Appendix shows that in round t, the weight put on s ik , k < t, is
This is the dynamic leverage factor T t times the standard Bayesian formula for E [vjs ik ]. 
If the dynamic leverage factors are constant, (27) is smaller than one because t 1 < t .
Proposition 0 (equilibrium with belief shocks)
For t 2 f1; ::; T g, equilibrium trade is
where f' 1 ; ::; ' T g solves 16 With a di¤used prior v = 0, in each period beliefs are completely replaced by " t . In this case, the non-stationary of the relative importance of prices as an endogenous information is lost. 17 Except in the …nal round 1 0 . See the Appendix for more details.
From (28), the larger dynamic leverage factor T t makes time t trading more speculationdriven, and hence more susceptible to belief shocks. The larger dynamic leverage factor also implies that prices are more informative through (29) and (30). Note that (29) and (30) jointly de…ne a continuous mapping from R T into itself, because { T t } 
T and for each t = 2; ::; T 1, only one of the following three cases is possible:
Proposition 1 shows that ' t can go up or down but the change is bounded by the value of s t=t 1 . In particular, it increases if and only if the speculation intensi…es, i.e., 1 < s t=t 1 .
To see when this can happen, recall (27). First, an increase in the stock of information t works against the speculation, captured by the term v "
To overturn this force and let traders act more aggressively on the signals than in the previous round,
T t T (t 1)
> 1, and
is su¢ ciently large, the additional bene…t of the 18 The upper bound ' t is given by the following recursive relationship:
signals for forecasting future prices leads to more speculation and faster learning. Figure 2 below illustrates the case where ' t can go up only for the su¢ ciently high value of . Dispersion, welfare, and volume. We measure the rate of changes in traders' beliefs by
, i.e., the ‡ow amount of information n t ' t divided by the stock t 1 .
Proposition 2 (dispersion and welfare)
The dispersion of the asset positions changes according to
and the social welfare at the end of period t is W t = . 19 With su¢ ciently large n, ' t decreases over time. When traders anticipate many trading rounds to come (i.e., high ), relaxing the local trading friction shifts the information aggregation to the earlier rounds.
Proposition 2 shows that the convergence rate of the asset positions between two rounds is bounded below by the benchmark rate 1 n , and it increases in the rate of changes in traders beliefs n t ' t t 1
. Therefore, one-shot belief shocks persistently slow down the convergence, and more quickly changing beliefs lead to the slower convergence. As the belief change becomes negligible ( n t ' t t 1 ! 0), the convergence rate approaches 1 n . From (29) and (30), for a given n, setting " ! 0 (given v > 0) or " ! 1 or v ! 1 or x ! 0 leads to ' t ! 0 for all t and the benchmark is obtained. As we discussed in Section 3, these are the cases where the speculation becomes negligible.
Finally, we study the volume. From Proposition 0, the equilibrium trade is
We use jq it j to denote the absolute value of (32), and measure the volume by E [jq it j].
20

Proposition 3 (dispersion and volume)
When the rate of changes in beliefs is su¢ ciently high, the dispersion and volume go up:
Proposition 3 shows that the dispersion and volume increase if and only if traders'beliefs change su¢ ciently quickly relative to n. For the dispersion to go up, we need two things:
(i) a su¢ cient amount of belief shocks goes into trading, (ii) the inventory management is not too e¤ective. The former requires that traders' beliefs change quickly consistent with the aggressive speculation, while the latter requires markets be small. The volume goes up if and only if the average rate of changes in beliefs for two rounds is su¢ ciently high. In fact, the condition (34) is a two-period average of the condition (33). Thus, if the dispersion goes up for two rounds, then the volume also goes up, but the converse is not necessarily true.
Discussion.
Our model predicts that, given the cross-sectional trade restriction, an asset for which traders acquire noisy information is more likely to have excessive trading compared with an asset not subject to such belief shocks. It is well known that "glamour" stocks with high M/B ratios tend to have higher volume. 21 According to our model, if noisy private information tends to be generated more for the glamour stocks 22 , then high volume can be generated by rational traders acting on idiosyncratic belief shocks.
Other results
Lemma 4 (volume dynamics)
Trading volume changes according to:
Lemma 4 decomposes the volume into the dispersion and the rate of changes in beliefs.
In the benchmark, (35) Figure 2 on page 114. 22 Or more generally for any stocks which attract attentions. Consider for example internet stocks during the dot-com bubble period. dispersion itself can go up, which tends to raise the volume through the inventory smoothing motive. Second, there is a gap between the volume ratio and the variance ratio, as shown in (36). When the rate of belief changes goes up, i.e.,
, this gap takes the value greater than one. In other words, when the learning accelerates, the change in the volume relative to the change in the dispersion goes up.
Lemma 5 (market size)
For su¢ ciently large n, the dispersion and volume monotonically decrease over time.
The Appendix shows that as n ! 1,
increases in n at the rate slower than n. Hence, the di¤erence between the convergence rate of (31) and that of the benchmark is small for su¢ ciently large n. Of course, with the maintained anonymity assumption, we cannot take the limit n ! 1 literally. Still, it is reassuring that this "large market limit" restores the benchmark dynamics, suggesting that the cross-sectional trading restriction is the key driver of the main results. Figure 3 below shows how the volume dynamics changes as n increases. 
Conclusion
We studied dynamic asset trading with two frictions: 1) trading is locally intermediated, and 2) traders are hit by one time belief shocks that generates learning. Without belief shocks, traders focus on the socially bene…cial trading and the allocation approaches the e¢ cient allocation over time. When belief shocks induce the speculation, the convergence becomes slower, and the allocation may move away from the e¢ cient allocation. When traders anticipate many trading rounds, traders'motives shift away from the socially bene…cial inventory management to the speculation that has no social value. A highly non-monotonic pattern in trading activity can arise from the non-stationarity of the endogenous learning process.
In this paper, we focused on the propagation of belief shocks, and did not address the strategic issue that are likely to be present in small markets. We leave the analysis of the interaction between these two aspects of the local trading for a future work.
Appendix
Numerical solutions
Unless noted otherwise, we solved the model for T = 10. Other model parameters are set as follows. " = 0:05; x = 5; n 2 f2; 3; 4; 5g v = 1; 2 f0; 0:125; 0:25; 0:5g
Proof
Proof of Lemma 1. This is a special case of Proposition 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.
We consider a generalized payment:
where p i is the unit price of the asset charged for trader i and the term c jq i j p i represents a transaction cost that depends on the dollar volume.
From the conjecture q i (p) = s s i0 x x i0 p p,
where s i0
The net trade at this price is
Note that p a¤ects p i but not q i (p i ). This price is informationally equivalent to
to write
First consider the realization of p i for which q i 6 = 0. The …rst order condition is
The second order condition < 0 is satis…ed. The optimal order, where p i is replaced with p to emphasize that it is to be determined, is
This veri…es the conjectured linear form and
By taking the ratio p s ,
The optimal order is
The price for i is
) and the trade for i is
Because only p depends on c, neither trade q i (p i ) nor allocation q i (p i ) + x i0 depends on c. Also, when traders use this order in equilibrium, there is a unique value of p i that makes q i (p i ) = 0. Because this is a zero probability event, using this order does not violate the optimality condition.
By taking the ratio
This has a unique solution ' 2 (0; 1). Using this, (37) can be written as
(n + 1) + 1 1
Other results related to Lemma 2. 
Proof. (a) De…ne
Using these,
Market clears because
The payment of trader i is
Therefore, the total payment by n + 1 traders when c = 0 is non-positive.
i > 0, the expected value of total payments is non-negative.
Proof of Lemma 3.
We prove the result for ' 1 with a general T period case. From (28) and (29) in Proposition 0,
Comparing (29) with (38),
Proof of Proposition 0. First, we study the …nal period t = T and one period before the …nal period, t = T 1.
Because there is no more trading after period T , the optimal order takes the same form as in the static case:
By equating coe¢ cients with those in (16) for t = T ,
+ T , k = 0; ::; T 1,
From the expression of
Hence, by normalizing by
, k = 0; ::; T 1,
The last condition can be solved for e p T :
Hence,
For t = T , this veri…es Property III and
Substituting derived coe¢ cients into (23) gives
This can be seen as an equation in ' T given (' 1 ; ::; ' T 1 ) and xT 1 , i.e.,
Because the right hand side must be positive for the solution to exist,
For a …xed (' 1 ; ::; ' T 1 ) and xT 1 , the left hand side of (42) is increasing in ' T and continuously changes from zero to positive in…nity for ' T 2 0;
n T 1 and the right hand side is decreasing in ' T . Hence, there is a unique ' T that solves (42) for any given (' 1 ; ::; ' T 1 ) and xT 1 .
Next, substituting derived coe¢ cients into (20) gives . Hence, the distribution of the asset positions in the previous period a¤ects the distribution in the following period through the learning channel.
Period t = T 1.
Trader i solves
where p iT , q iT , x iT are given by (39), (40), (41). The …rst line in the expression above is the expected utility for the case the game ends after trading in period T 1, while the second line corresponds to the case where there is another trading round. Dropping irrelevant terms,
The last term shows up because the additional unit of the risky asset today would save the purchase tomorrow if and only if the game continues. Hence, the optimal order at T 1 is
From (39),
We de…ne
Finally, recall from (24) that
By equating coe¢ cients with those in (16) for t = T 1,
.
. By normalizing this,
, k = 0; ::; T 2,
The last condition can be solved for p T 1 :
Proceeding similarly as before,
This can be seen as an equation in ' T 1 given (' 1 ; ::; ' T 2 ; ' T ) and xT 2 :
Given (' 1 ; ::; ' T 2 ), the left hand side of (43) is increasing in ' T 1 and continuously changes from zero to positive in…nity for ' T 1 2 0; T 2 n T 2 . On the other hand, the right hand side is decreasing in ' T 1 if 1 2 . 23 We focus on the case where there is a unique ' T 1 that solves (43) for any given (' 1 ; ::; ' T 2 ; ' T ) and xT 2 .
Also, substituting derived coe¢ cients into (20) gives
1 as a function of ' 1 ; ::; ' T is increasing in each argument if > 0, but Finally, this last expression can be substituted into (42) to obtain
The characterization for other periods is by a straightforward induction.
Proof of Proposition 1. ' t 1 ' t v "
Clearly, ' t must decrease over time. Other results related to T t . For " 2 (0; 1), T t T (t 1) for t = 1; ::; T 1, with strict inequality if v > 0.
Proof.
If v = 0, the result holds with equality. Otherwise, consider . By an induction, it su¢ ces to show 2 < 1 . This is true because 2 < 1 if and only if Using these in (20) , 
= n + 1 n n t 1 n t 1 n t ' t This is increasing in t but bounded above by 1 2 . Recall the conditions in Proposition 3:
Neither can be satis…ed for su¢ ciently large n.
